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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bruce Reed appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his Final
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“Final Amended Petition”). On appeal, Mr. Reed
asserts that he raised an issue of material fact as to whether his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to redact from an interrogation certain statements made by
Mr. Reed which would tend to be interpreted by the jury as meaning he had committed a similar
offense in the past. Additionally, Mr. Reed’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to request a unanimity instruction informing the jury that it must unanimously agree on
the specific occurrence giving rise to the offense.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2010, Mr. Reed was charged by Information with enticing of children over the
internet.

(R.38806, pp.30-31.)1

The single criminal charge stems from numerous internet

communications Mr. Reed had with “borahjenny,” a middle aged male police detective, between
September 29, 2009 and February 10, 2010. (R.38806, pp.30-31.) Over the five months the
online communications were occurring, Mr. Reed did not attempt to personally meet with
“borahjenny,” despite Detective Smith’s attempts, on numerous occasions, to facilitate a
meeting. (See 11/25/09 Chat, p.1; 1/12/10 Chat, pp.1-2; 1/25/10 Chat, pp.2-3.)2

1

Mr. Reed has filed a motion requesting that this Court take judicial notice of the Clerk’s Record
in the underlying direct appeal in S.C. Docket No. 38806 contemporaneously with this
Appellant’s Brief. For ease of reference, the Clerk’s Record in S.C. Docket No. 38806 is cited
herein as “R.38806, p.”
2
Contemporaneous with this brief, Mr. Reed has filed a motion requesting that this Court take
judicial notice of the State’s exhibits which were admitted at trial and are contained in the
underlying direct appeal in S.C. Docket No. 38806 For ease of reference, State’s Exhibit 2, the
1

In fact, when Detective Smith asked Mr. Reed for his telephone number and address,
Mr. Reed refused to provide it. (38806 Tr., p.358, L.24 – p.259, L.43 (Mr. Reed declining to
give his address and telephone number to “borahjenny”), p.382, Ls.11-16 (Mr. Reed declining to
give his telephone number to “borahjenny”).) Moreover, on a number of different occasions
throughout the five months, Mr. Reed questioned “borahjenny” as to whether she was with law
enforcement. (Chat 11/23/09, pp.2-3 (Mr. Reed asking “borahjenny” if she is associated with the
law and asking “borahjenny to unlock “her” Myspace account so Mr. Reed can see “her”),
1/20/10 Chat, p.2 (Mr. Reed suspecting “borahjenny” is law enforcement).)

In fact, even

Detective Smith believed that Mr. Reed was “undecided” as to whether “borahjenny” was with
law enforcement. (38806 Tr., p.389, Ls.7-22.)
In July of 2010, Mr. Reed was convicted of the charged count of enticing a child over the
internet and the district court imposed a unified sentence of eleven years, with two years fixed.
(R., p.163.) Mr. Reed filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.163.) Mr. Reed’s conviction and
sentence were affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in December of 2012. (R., p.163.) The
Idaho Supreme Court denied review and a remittitur was issued on May 7, 2013. (R., p.163.)
On February 12, 2014, Mr. Reed filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (”Petition”)
wherein he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1)
refusing to argue his defense in the manner he requested; (2) allowing the prosecutor to present a
partial video of his interrogation; (3) refusing to call witnesses; (4) directing the jury to not
follow the statute during closing argument; (5) calling him “Bozo the Clown” during closing;

Chat Dialog, will be cited in accordance with the date of the referenced chat and the page
number contained therein.
3
Mr. Reed has filed a motion requesting that this Court take judicial notice of the trial transcript
from the underlying direct appeal, which is cited herein as “38806 Tr.” for ease of reference.

2

and (6) telling the jury he had a family member that was the victim of sexual abuse. (R., pp.5-7.)
The State filed an Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.11-15.) In addition, the
State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.18-26.)
Appointed counsel for Mr. Reed then filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for PostConviction Relief (“Amended Petition”). (R., pp.33-34, 37-40.) The district court entered an
order granting Mr. Reed’s motion seeking leave to amend his Petition. (R., p.42.) Thereafter,
Mr. Reed filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.50-64.) In his Amended
Petition, Mr. Reed alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for: (1)
failing to present a reasonable defense theory at trial by not allowing Mr. Reed to present the
theory that he never believed he was chatting with a fifteen-year-old girl; (2) advising Mr. Reed
to be untruthful during his testimony by not permitting him to testify that he did not believe he
was chatting with a fifteen-year-old girl; (3) failing to seek admission at trial the entire recording
of his police interrogation; (4) failing to reveal the concurrent conflict of interest that trial
counsel had a family member who had been the victim of sexual abuse; (5) failing to conduct a
reasonable investigation by not speaking with potential fact witnesses Steven Reed and John
Graham; (6) failing to call Steven Reed and John Graham to testify during the trial; (7) calling
Mr. Reed “Bozo the Clown” during closing; (8) failing to object to the detective reading the
transcripts aloud to the jury; (9) failing to request a unanimity instruction; and (10) failing to
object to Instruction No. 9. (R., pp.53-61.) Instruction No. 9 provided:
it shall not constitute a defense against any charge or violation of the law
prohibiting Enticing of Children over the Internet that a law enforcement officer,
peace officer, or other person working at the direction of law enforcement was
involved in the detection or investigation or a violation of the law prohibiting
Enticing of Children over the Internet.

3

(R., p.55.)
Mr. Reed filed an Affidavit in Support of his Amended Petition. (R., pp.65-66.) In his
affidavit, Mr. Reed averred that he never believed “borahjenny” was a fifteen-year-old girl and
actually thought “borahjenny” was a member of law enforcement. (R., p.65.) Mr. Reed further
asserted his trial attorney had told him that this theory of defense was not a reasonable defense,
would make him appear arrogant and untrustworthy, and he understood his trial counsel to be
telling him to “not tell the whole truth” when he testified. (R., p.66.) Finally, Mr. Reed stated
that he told his trial attorney to contact John Graham and Steven Reed who would testify
consistently with his belief that “borahjenny” was a member of law enforcement. (R., p.66.)
The State filed an Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.73-75.)
Mr. Reed then filed a motion with the district court seeking to conduct civil discovery,
which was granted by the district court. (R., pp.67-68, 82-83.) Thereafter, Mr. Reed filed a
Motion for Permission to Conduct Deposition of Trial Counsel, Keith Roark, which was granted
by the district court. (R., pp.84-87, 89.) The deposition of Mr. Roark was conducted on
March 18, 2015. (See R., pp.149-159.) Mr. Roark testified that he had known Mr. Reed since
Mr. Reed was a child and it was clear from the beginning the case was going to trial.
(R., pp.149-150.) Mr. Roark stated that in 38 years of practicing law, he has never advised a
client to testify to anything less than the truth. (R., p.151.)
Thereafter, Mr. Reed filed his Final Amended Petition. (R., pp.50-64, 104-121.) With
regard to his claims related to the introduction of the interrogation video, Mr. Reed asserted,
“Trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to request that Mr. Reed’s statement ‘I
have changed’ be redacted from the video and such deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Reed’s
right to a fair trial.” (R., p.110.) As to the claim his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance

4

of counsel in failing to request a unanimity instruction, Mr. Reed asserted, “[w]ithout a
unanimity instruction, some jurors could have convicted Mr. Reed based on one particular chat;
thus preventing the jury from arriving at a unanimous conclusion.” (R., p.115.) The State filed
an Answer to Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Amended Motion for Summary
Disposition. (R., pp.122-124, 127-146.)
The district court then entered its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Final Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief (“Notice”). (R., pp.162-176.) With regard to Mr. Reed’s claim that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to redact the “I have changed”
language out of the interrogation video, the district court concluded that trial counsel’s “failure to
place the words in context was a strategic and tactical decision which cannot serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief.” (R., pp.169-170.) Additionally, the district court concluded, “Reed has
not alleged facts which, if true, would demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different had Mr. Roark requested that other portions of the
interview be played or that the statement be redacted.” (R., p.170.)
As to the failure to request a unanimity instruction, the district court concluded the crime
of enticing a minor over the internet, pursuant to I.C. § 18-1509A, “could conceivably been
committed in a single instance” but “could also be committed by a continuous course of action,
the cumulative effect of which represents a single violation.” (R., p.174.) In addition, even if a
unanimity instruction should have been given, the failure to do so did not result in prejudice.
(R., pp.174-175.)
The district court’s Notice was entered on September 4, 2015. (R., pp.162-176.) On
November 30, 2015, after not receiving any response from Mr. Reed, the district court entered its

5

Order Summarily Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on the grounds articulated in
the Notice. (R., pp.178-192.) Mr. Reed filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.194-196.)

6

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Reed’s claim that his trial attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to move to redact statements made
during a recorded interrogation that tended to implicate Mr. Reed in prior misconduct?

2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Reed’s claim that his trial attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request a unanimity instruction?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Reed’s Claim That His Trial Attorney
Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing Redact Portions Of His Interrogation
That Tended To Implicate Mr. Reed In Prior Misconduct
Mr. Reed contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his
attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to redact from a recorded
interrogation certain statements made by Mr. Reed which would tend to be interpreted by the
jury as meaning he had committed a similar offense in the past. In this case, Mr. Reed has raised
an issue of material fact as to whether his attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the
outcome of his case.
A.

Applicable Legal Standards
1. Summary Dismissal Standards
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and distinct

from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction. Peltier v. State, 119
Idaho 454, 456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (“UPCPA”) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 – 19-4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App.
1995). However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint
initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to include more than “a short and
plain statement of the claim”; it “must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations
must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached.”
8

Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. “In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.”
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998).
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c). In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district court
need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Martinez, 126 Idaho at 816-17. However, if
the petitioner presents some evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take
the petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the State.
Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on
their face. Id. Thus, only after the State controverts the petitioner’s allegations can the district
court consider the evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so,
it must still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner,
Small, 132 Idaho at 331.
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the finding of
contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations of law.
Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal order de novo.
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03, 128 P.3d 938, 939-40 (2006).
2.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through postconviction proceedings.

Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765 (Ct. App. 2008).

9

The Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal case the right
to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the due process
clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of
the Sixth Amendment, including the counsel clause. Id. at 685.
“When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance,
the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment “relies . . . on the legal profession’s
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will fulfill the
role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.” Id. The “proper measure of
attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id.
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also must
prove that he was prejudiced. “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).

“A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. However, a “defendant need
not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.”
Id. at 693. As was recognized by Justice O’Conner, the author of the Strickland Opinion, in her
concurring decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a preponderance
of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding would have been
different, that decision would be “diametrically different,” “opposite in character
or nature,” and “mutually opposed” to our clearly established precedent because
we held in Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a “reasonable
probability that ··· the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

10

Id. at 405-06 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
B.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Reed’s Claim That His Attorney
Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Redact Statements Made
During A Recording Interrogation That Was Played For The Jury
During Mr. Reed’s interview with law enforcement, the following colloquy took place

between Mr. Reed and an officer and was played for the jury:
Officer:

I agree it hurts them when a loved one messes up like this, but what they
want is the best for you.

Reed:

I’ve been working hard and I try and I love everybody.

Officer:

They want to see that you can change.

Reed:

I have changed.

(R., p.169.) Prior to the above statements, the officer had asked Mr. Reed whether the new
charges would be difficult on his family in light of his prior kidnapping charges in another case.
(R., p.169.) The jury was presented with the redacted version of the recorded interview which
did not include references to the difficulty Mr. Reed’s family may have with the new charges
because of his kidnapping charges in the other case. (R., p.169.)
In his Amended Petition, Mr. Reed initially claimed that his trial attorney was ineffective
for failing to request the admission at trial other portions of his interview with law enforcement.
(R., p.53.) Mr. Reed asserted that the video interview, as redacted by the State, “was prejudicial
in that it left out portions of the interview that were relevant to explain away or qualify the
context in which the statements were made.” (R., p.55.) Then, in his Final Amended Petition,
Mr. Reed argued “Trial Counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to request that
Mr. Reed’s statement, ‘I have changed’ be redacted from the video and such deficient
performance prejudiced Mr. Reed’s right to a fair trial.” (R., p.110.) Mr. Reed argued that his

11

statements, taken out of context, “left the jury no other choice but to put them in the context of
the trial. Specifically, that he had once engaged in enticing children but now he has changed.”
(R., p.110.) The district court summarily dismissed this claim, first finding it was a strategic and
tactical decision based upon the attorney’s testimony “that the statement ‘I have changed’ did not
raise any concern to him and he did not believe it raised any concerns with the jury because it
could have referred to a myriad of things.” (R., p.170.) Second, the district court concluded that
“Reed has not alleged facts, if true, would demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of
the proceeding would have been different had Mr. Roark requested . . . that the statement be
redacted.” (R., p.170.)
1.

Mr. Reed’s Trial Counsel Was Deficient In Failing To Redact Mr. Reed’s
Statement, “I Have Changed,” From The Video Played To The Jury As It Tends
To Implicate Mr. Reed In Prior Misconduct

It is part of the American legal system that an accused may only be convicted based upon
proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged and not based upon poor character.
State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244, 880 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct. App. 1994). Evidence of misconduct
not charged in an underlying offense may have an unjust influence on the jurors and may lead
them to determine guilt based upon either: (1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before,
he must have done it this time; or (2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the
defendant committed the charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other
bad acts. Id. at 244-45, 880 P.2d at 774-75. Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character
evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have acted consistently
with those past acts or traits. Id.
In this case, in context, Mr. Reed’s statement, “I have changed,” tends to implicate
Mr. Reed in prior, similar misconduct.

The jury heard that a person’s family is harmed when

12

that person “messes up” and the family wants to know the person can change. (R., p.169.)
Mr. Reed’s next statement, “I have changed,” indicates to the jury that Mr. Reed has been
charged with or committed something similar in the past, and despite the officers statements to
the contrary, he is not the person he once was, the person that previously messed up. The district
court’s conclusion that this was a strategic decision by trial counsel was in error. That trial
counsel personally did not see any problems with the statement is irrelevant, the question is
whether the jury could have construed the statement negatively. The trial counsel’s conclusion
that the statement “could have referred to a myriad of things” emphasizes the problem with
allowing the jury to hear it – that the jury could have viewed the statement as an admission of
prior similar misconduct. The statement or colloquy at issue has zero relevance to the purpose
behind allowing the jury to hear the video, and as such, there was no reason, strategic or
otherwise, to allow the jury to hear the potentially damaging statements.
Accordingly, trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to redact the “I have
changed” language from the interrogation interview played for the jury.
2.

There Is A Reasonable Probability That But For The Introduction Of The
Improper Statement, The Outcome Of The Trial Would Have Been Different

If Mr. Reed’s trial counsel would have redacted the video interrogation to remove
Mr. Reed’s statement, “I have changed,” the outcome of the trial would have been different. In
his deposition, Mr. Reed’s trial counsel testified that he saw the trial judge in a mediation and the
trial judge told him “I thought you had that case won” and Mr. Reed’s trial counsel agreed.
(R., p.153.) In fact, as is set forth in the statement of facts, the State’s evidence against Mr. Reed
was far from significant where Mr. Reed testified that he did not believe the person he was
chatting with was a minor and made no attempts to actually meet her in person. (See 11/25/09
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Chat, p.1; 1/12/10 Chat, pp.1-2; 1/25/10 Chat, pp.2-3.)

However, the concern with prior

misconduct evidence is the jury’s presumption that because an individual committed a bad act
before, it is more likely that person committed the charged act. Thus, despite the sparse evidence
of a criminal act offered at trial, the jury could have, and likely did, find Mr. Reed guilty of
enticement of a minor over the internet not based on the evidence offered, but upon a belief that
if he did this before, he likely committed the instant offense.
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, there is a reasonable possibility that but for the
introduction of the inadmissible statement, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
II.
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Reed’s Claim That His Trial Attorney
Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Request A Unanimity Instruction
In his Final Amended Petition, Mr. Reed alleged that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a unanimity instruction. (R., pp.59-60.)
Mr. Reed argued:
In this case, the alleged conduct consisted of several internet chats occurring over
the course of five months. Trial counsel failed to ask the district court to instruct
the jury that it must unanimously agree on which of the alleged chats constituted
the alleged enticement. Without a unanimity instruction, some jurors could have
convicted Mr. Reed based on one particular chat, while other jurors could have
convicted him on a different chat; thus preventing the jury from arriving at a
unanimous conclusion.
(R., p.60.) In his Amended Final Petition, the Mr. Reed reiterated his argument that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a unanimity instruction.
(R., pp.114-115.)
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Reed’s claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request an unanimity instruction, first concluding

14

the crime of enticing a minor over the internet, pursuant to I.C. § 18-1509A, “could conceivably
been committed in a single instance” but “could also be committed by a continuous course of
action, the cumulative effect of which represents a single violation.” (R., p.174.) In addition, the
district court found that even if a unanimity instruction should have been given, the failure to do
so did not result in prejudice. (R., pp.174-175.)
1.

Trial Counsel’s Failure To Request A Unanimity Instruction Was Deficient
Performance

An appellate court exercises free review over whether a jury was given proper
instructions. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). Generally, “An error in jury
instructions only constitutes reversible error when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced
the party challenging the instruction.” Id. Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law
necessary for their consideration, including “instructions on rules of law that are ‘material to the
determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.’”

Severson, 147 Idaho at 710 (citing

I.C. § 19-2132) (quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 (Ct. App. 1999)).
Under Idaho law, a trial court must instruct the jury that they must unanimously agree on
the defendant’s guilt for the defendant to be convicted. Idaho Const. art. I § 7; I.C. §§ 19-2316
& 19-2317; Severson, 147 Idaho at 711.

However, “An instruction that the jury must

unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense . . . is generally not required.”
Severson, 147 Idaho at 711 (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991); State v. Nunez,
133 Idaho 13, 19 (1999)). Still, due process bars states from convicting a person for a violation
of a generic category of “crime” based upon any combination of facts the state sees fit to allege.
Schad, 501 U.S. at 633.
“An instruction informing the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific
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occurrence giving rise to the offense is necessary, however, when the defendant commits several
acts, each of which would independently support a conviction for the crime charged.” Severson,
147 Idaho at 711 (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172-73 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Montoya,
140 Idaho 160, 167-68 (Ct. App. 2004); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000)). In such
a situation, “the trial court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific
incident constituting the offense in each count, regardless of whether the defendant requests such
an instruction. Gain, 140 Idaho at 172-73. Alternatively, jury unanimity may be protected by
the State’s election of the incident upon which it will rely for the conviction. Id. at 173.
Here, Mr. Reed was charged by Information with felony enticing of children over the
internet. The Information alleged:
That the Defendant, BRUCE E. REED, on or between the 29th day of September,
2009, and the 10th day of February, 2010 . . . did knowingly use the internet to
solicit, lure, persuade or entice by words and/or action a minor child under the age
of sixteen (16) years, or a person the Defendant believed to be a minor child under
the age of sixteen (16) year [sic], to engage in a sexual act with/or against the
child where such act is in violation of chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code,
to wit: ‘borahjenny,’ to engage in a sexual act where such act would constitute a
lewd and lascivious act, to wit: by soliciting a person believed by the Defendant
to be fifteen (15) years of age to engage in oral to genital and/or genital to genital
contact and/or manual to genital contact with the Defendant.
(R.38806, pp.30-31.) Idaho Code § 18-1509A provides:
(1) A person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a felony if such
person knowingly uses the internet or any device that provides transmission of
messages, signals, facsimiles, video images or other communication to solicit,
seduce, lure, persuade or entice by words or actions, or both, a person under the
age of sixteen (16) years or a person the defendant believes to be under the age of
sixteen (16) years to engage in any sexual act with or against the person where
such act would be a violation of chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code.
IDAHO CODE § 18-1509A (2010).
Mr. Reed right to due process was clearly violated here, because he allegedly committed
several acts, each of which could independently support a conviction for the charged offense of
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enticing a minor over the internet. Whether a course of criminal conduct constitutes a single or
multiple acts requires an inquiry into the circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the
intent and objective of the actor. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997); State v. Major, 111
Idaho 410, 414 (1986). For this inquiry, an appellate court asks whether there was “a distinct
union of mens rea and actus reus separated by a discrete period of time and circumstances from
any other such similar incident” for each of the alleged acts. Miller, 135 Idaho at 268; see
Severson, 147 Idaho at 711-12.
Here, the prosecution alleged, and offered evidence at trial, that the conduct amounting to
the charged offense occurred between September of 2009 and February of 2010, approximately
five months. (See R.38806, pp.30-31; State’s Exhibit 2.) Throughout the five month period,
Mr. Reed “chatted” with “borahjenny” on thirty-two occasions, each of which occurred on a
separate day. (See State’s Exhibit 2.) Of those online “chats,” fourteen (14) communications,
each occurring on a separate date, could be construed an attempt to entice “borahjenny” to
“engage in oral to genital and/or genital to genital contact and/or manual to genital contact” with
Mr. Reed and charged as a separate offense. (See 10/13/09 Chat, p.2, 10/26/09 Chat, p.2,
10/27/09 Chat, p.3, 10/28/09 Chat, p.2, 11/3/09 Chat, p.1, 11/5/09 Chat, p.2, 11/11/09 Chat, p.2,
11/19/09 Chat, pp.1-2, 11/23/09 Chat, pp.1-2, 12/28/09 Chat, pp2-3., 1/7/10 Chat, p.1, 1/11/10
Chat, pp.1-3, 1/12/10 Chat, p.2, 1/20/10 Chat, p.10.) Because each online communication that
references a sexual act is separated in day and time, and each constitutes an entirely distinct
conversation, there are multiple acts that could each result in a separate conviction.
Additionally, the State’s Information or presentation of evidence at trial did not clearly elect the
specific act or conduct upon which it was seeking to obtain its conviction for enticing a child
over the internet. As such, Mr. Reed’s trial counsel was deficient for failing request a unanimity
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instruction.
2.

There Is A Reasonable Probability That Had A Unanimity Instruction Been
Given, The Outcome Of The Trial Would Have Been Different

Mr. Reed asserts that if the jury had been properly instructed and given a unanimity
instruction, the outcome of his trial would have been different. “The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)

(emphasis added). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id. Here, because the State failed to allege a specific act or conduct upon
which the jury was to base its verdict, there is a reasonable probability that individual jurors
could have based each of their decisions to find Mr. Reed guilty upon different conduct offered
at trial. In fact, the State offered fourteen different instances of separate conduct upon which the
jury could have found Mr. Reed guilty. (See 10/13/09 Chat, p.2, 10/26/09 Chat, p.2, 10/27/09
Chat, p.3, 10/28/09 Chat, p.2, 11/3/09 Chat, p.1, 11/5/09 Chat, p.2, 11/11/09 Chat, p.2, 11/19/09
Chat, pp.1-2, 11/23/09 Chat, pp.1-2, 12/28/09 Chat, pp2-3., 1/7/10 Chat, p.1, 1/11/10 Chat, pp.13, 1/12/10 Chat, p.2, 1/20/10 Chat, p.10.)

It is highly unlikely that all jurors agreed upon the

same singular act of the fourteen separately alleged acts upon which it could have based its
verdict. Further, it is likely some of the jurors could have concluded that conduct, upon which
other jurors found amounted to enticing a child over the internet, was insufficient to result in a
conviction for the charged offense.
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, there is a reasonable probability that if a unanimity
instruction had been given, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his Final Amended Petition and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
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